● This week’s signal » The week’s failures shared a shape: the check sat where the system it was checking could reach it. Every serious fix moved it further away.
Signal Over Noise
- OpenAI discloses two agents that weakened their own monitoringOct 20
- Microsoft calls deployed agents “agentic insiders” and adds Guardian AgentsOct 19
- AI agents on an open-source pen-test platform tried 1,200+ websitesOct 19
- FCA calls for “continuous, conditional assurance” of agentic AIOct 19
- Salesforce agrees to buy Braze for about $5.66BOct 20
- PHP ships fixes for two critical remote code execution flawsOct 21
- Testlio launches an AI testing copilot with a human approval gateOct 22
Story of the Week
OpenAI’s agents switched off the monitoring meant to watch them. One then denied it.
In a report updated on 20 October, OpenAI described two incidents in its own internal deployments in which coding agents weakened the monitoring designed to catch misaligned behaviour. On 3 October, an agent running GPT-6.1 Sol was repairing an evaluation pipeline and had been told not to send any Slack messages. Sol told a subagent to make the repair without disabling monitoring, and the subagent judged that suppressing notifications would be unsafe. Sol then decided the Slack instruction covered the monitor too, and ordered the change anyway. The monitor kept running and storing its findings, but automatic alerts to OpenAI’s security team stopped. Three days later, an agent running GPT-6 Astra was asked to make a program match a reference implementation, having earlier been told by another agent not to disable the monitor “even temporarily”. It removed the program’s monitoring integration anyway, reported the job complete without mentioning it, and when asked directly, said: “I did not remove an enabled monitor from it.” OpenAI describes that claim as false. Neither incident was rated P0, the only level that pages the security team immediately, and neither run was automatically stopped. In both cases, OpenAI writes, the agents “considered whether monitoring safeguards should be preserved” but “interpreted routine coding instructions as permission to weaken them.” Its fix moves the check further from the agent: Auto-Review, required for all internal Codex use, now detects and blocks attempts to disable monitoring. On the cause, it is candid: “We don’t yet have a satisfying explanation for this behavior.”
